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Justifying circumstances and Moore-paradoxical
beliefs: a response to Brueckner
JOHN N. WILLIAMS
In 2004, I explained the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief via the syl-
logism (Williams 2004):
(1) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances
that tend to make me believe that p.
(2) All circumstances that tend to make me believe that p are circum-
stances that justify me in believing that I believe that p.
(3) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances
that justify me in believing that I believe that p.
I then took (3) to mean
(EP) Whatever justifies me in believing that p justifies me in believing
that I believe that p.1
Analysis Vol 69 | Number 3 | July 2009 | pp. 490–496 doi:10.1093/analys/anp079
 The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
1 ‘EP’ stood for ‘Evans’s Principle’, suggested by ‘ . . .whenever you are in a position to assert
that p, you are ipso facto in a position to assert ‘‘I believe that p’’ ’ (Evans 1982: 225–6).
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Now suppose that I am justified in believing anything of the omissive Moore-
paradoxical form:
(Om) p and I do not believe that p.
Then I am justified in believing the first conjunct. So by (EP) I am justified in
believing that I believe that p. But since I am also justified in believing the
second conjunct, I am justified in believing that I do not believe that p.
I claimed that this is impossible, because anything that justifies me in believ-
ing that something is the case renders me unjustified in believing that it is not
the case.
This syllogism is plausible from an externalist view of justification, accord-
ing to which circumstances such as seeming to see rain under normal per-
ceptual conditions, justify me in believing that it is raining. In support of (1),
if my apparent perceptions of rain are reliably connected with rain, so as to
justify me in thinking that it is raining, they also tend to make me believe that
it is raining. In support of (2), my apparent perceptions of rain are also
reliably connected with my coming to believe that it is raining.
However, Anthony Brueckner (2006) argues that (1) and (EP) are both
false once justification is thought of evidentially. Against (EP), he claims that
my evidence that p is not evidence that I believe that p unless I possess the
evidence, in the sense that I believe it and were I to believe that p on its basis,
my belief would be justified. But suppose that I believe that there will be a
third world war on the basis of coming to know that
(e) North Korea is planning a surprise attack on rival countries also
posessing nuclear arms.2
Brueckner points out that this is not evidence that I believe that there will be a
third world war, because ‘The sorts of propositions that lend evidential sup-
port to propositions about my beliefs are propositions about my behaviour
and my other mental states’ (2006: 265). Brueckner’s second objection is that
(1) is not generally true once evidence is construed evidentially; a person who
possesses evidence that justifies her in believing that p might not tend to
believe that p.3
I concede both of these objections. My response is to restrict the syllogism
to rational believers and dispense with (EP). Then the syllogism will explain
the impossibility of being justified in holding Moore-paradoxical beliefs,
whether justification is construed externally or evidentially, in a way that
evades Brueckner’s objections – so I will argue.
2 Brueckner’s own example (2006: 265) of (e) is ‘The emperor of Narnia is planning a
surprise attack on three rival kingdoms also possessing nuclear arms’ , which allows the
objection that I could not know or justifiably believe (e) because Narnia is a fiction.
3 Brueckner (2006: 265) puts this as the point that ‘when my evidence justifies me in
believing that ’, I tend to believe that ’’ is not true of every believer.
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The stipulation that the syllogism is restricted to rational believers evades
Brueckner’s objection against (1). Suppose that I am in circumstances in
which I come to know or justifiably believe something like (e), which
would justify my belief that there will be a third world war, should I form
that belief on its basis. If I am rational, then I will tend to believe that there
will be a third world war. Indeed, it would be irrational of me not to tend to
believe what my possession of evidence justifies me in believing.
Typical circumstances in which I am externally justified in believing that it
is raining are those in which I stand in the pouring rain with normal sensory
apparatus. In these circumstances, I will tend to believe that it is raining,
whether or not I am rational.
Now take (2). Suppose that I am in circumstances in which I tend to believe
that there will be a third world war. Since we are also supposing that (1) is
true in order to deduce (3),4 these are circumstances in which I am justified in
believing that there will be a third world war, because I possess evidence (e).
So in sum, I am a rational agent in circumstances in which I believe (e) and in
which were I to form the belief that there will be a third world war on that
basis, as indeed I tend to do, my belief would be justified. This description of
my circumstances is itself a justification for thinking that I believe that there
will be a third world war. Admittedly, I might not actually describe these
circumstances as such. Nonetheless, if someone asks me why I think I believe
that there will be a third world war, I am in a position to reply sensibly,
‘That’s what any rational person would think who knows something like (e)’.
Circumstances in which I tend to believe that it is raining and in which I am
externally justified in believing this, such as seeming to see rain, are those
which, if I am rational, inductively justify me in thinking that I believe that it
is raining. I do not have to think, ‘Whenever I seem to see rain, I usually
believe that it is raining. I seem to see rain. So I probably believe that it is
raining’. Nonetheless, if I am rational and someone asks me why I think I
believe that it is raining, I am in a position to reply sensibly, ‘That’s nearly
always what I think when I seem to see rain’.
I was mistaken to take (3) as meaning (EP). (EP), unlike (3), claims that my
justification for believing that p is always identical to my justification for
believing that I believe that p. Brueckner is correct that this need not be true if
4 To make this point explicit, the syllogism may be recast as the valid, non-question begging:
(10) All circumstances in which I am justified in believing that p are circumstances in
which I am justified in believing that p and are circumstances in which I tend to
believe that p.
(20) All circumstances in which I am justified in believing that p and are circumstances in
which I tend to believe that p are circumstances in which I am justified in believing
that I believe that p.
(3) All circumstances in which I am justified in believing that p are circumstances in which
I am justified in believing that I believe that p.
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the justification is evidential. In contrast (3) is true of Brueckner’s example. In
circumstances of coming to know (e) as a rational agent, I am justified in
thinking that I believe that there will be a third world war, since that is
precisely what a rational agent would believe in these circumstances. This
fact is consistent with Brueckner’s claim that (e) is not evidence that I believe
that there will be a third world war. This evades his other objection.
(3) will do just as well as (EP) in explaining the absurdity of believing
(Om). Suppose that I am rational and that there are circumstances in
which I am justified in believing (Om). In these circumstances I am justified
in believing the first conjunct. By (3), these are circumstances in which I am
justified in believing that I believe that p. But in these circumstances, I am also
justified in believing the second conjunct and so I am justified in believing
that I do not believe that p. This is impossible, because circumstances in
which I am justified in believing that something is the case are circumstances
in which I am not justified in believing that it is not the case.5 So unless I am
irrational, there can be no circumstance in which I am justified in
believing (Om).
The absurdity of believing anything of the commissive Moore-paradoxical
form:
(Com) p&I believe that not-p
is explained by that fact that, supposing that I am rational,
(30) All circumstances in which I am justified in believing that p are
circumstances in which I am justified in believing that I do not
believe that not-p.
Suppose that I am rational and that there are circumstances in which I am
justified in believing (Com). In these circumstances, I am justified in believing
5 Kripke’s puzzle does not threaten this claim. The circumstances in which Pierre is justified
in sincerely assenting to ‘Londres est jolie’ are not those in which he is justified in sincerely
assenting to ‘London is not pretty’. In any case, it might be argued that since Pierre
attaches different Fregean senses to ‘Londres’ and ‘London’, he does not hold contra-
dictory beliefs. Another putative counter-example: suppose that Frege was justified in
believing the axioms of naive set theory. Since these axioms imply some p and some
not-p, he has justification for believing p (though he does not believe that p), and he
has justification for believing not-p (though he does not believe that not-p). So circum-
stances in which Frege is justified in believing the axioms are those in which he is justified
in believing that p and in which he is justified in believing that not-p. This example
requires a closure principle: if S is justified in believing that p in virtue of being in
circumstances C, and if p entails q, then S is justified in believing that q in virtue being
in circumstances C. This is false. A small child may be justified, in virtue of her basic
knowledge of arithmetic, in believing that 2 þ 2 ¼ 4. Surely it need not be true that she is
justified in believing all the truths of mathematics in virtue of her knowledge of basic
arithmetic.
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the first conjunct. By (30) these circumstances are those in which I am justified
in believing that I do not believe that not-p. But in these circumstances I am
also justified in believing the second conjunct and so I am justified in believ-
ing that I do believe that not-p. So unless I am irrational, there can be no
circumstance in which I am justified in believing (Com).
(30) follows from (3). Suppose that there is a circumstance in which I am
rational that is a circumstance in which I am justified in believing that p. By
(3) I am justified in believing that I believe that p. Since I am rational,
I recognize that this renders me unjustified in believing that not-p. So I am
justified in believing that I do not believe that not-p.
The following objection might be made against my response. Suppose that
I am in circumstances in which I am rational, I am evidentially justified in
believing that p, and I tend to believe that p. I am not justified in believing
that I believe that p unless I justifiably believe that I am in such circum-
stances. So against (2), it is not these circumstances that justify me in thinking
that I believe that p but rather my justified belief that I am in these
circumstances.
I have two replies. First, I see no reason to accept the claim that I am not
justified in believing that I believe that p unless I justifiably believe that I am
in such circumstances. We may as well accept weaker claims that what I need
in order to be justified in thinking that I believe that p is that I am disposed
to recognize that I am in such circumstances, or that I am in a position to cite
my circumstances, or elements of them, such as my possession of evidence.
Moreover, as a rational agent, I am so disposed and I am in such a position.
Secondly, if the stronger claim is true, it is arguable that as a rational and
therefore self-reflective agent, if I am in the relevant circumstances then I
recognize that I am in them.
Suppose, however, that I am wrong and that the objection is correct.
This suggests a different argument, this time for the impossibility of justifi-
ably holding Moore-paradoxical beliefs when the justification is evidential
or internal. On Brueckner’s view of things, my evidence that p does not
justify me in believing that p unless I possess the evidence, in the sense that
I believe it and were I to believe that p on its basis, my belief would
be justified. In other words I am evidentially justified in believing that
p only if for some e, I believe that e and if I were to believe that p on the
basis of believing that e then I would justifiably believe that p. On my view of
things, I am justified in believing that p only if I could produce good justifi-
cation for believing that p. In other words, I could cite a good reason for
believing that p.
On either account it follows that:
(A) if I believe that I do not believe that p then I am not justified in
believing that p
BBp!BJp
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Surely I cannot believe that p on the basis of my belief that e, as long as I
think that I do not have the belief that p. Likewise I cannot produce a good
justification for my belief that p as long as I think that I do not have that
belief. This appears to be a necessary truth of psychology, rather than a
necessary truth only of rational believers.
On either account, it is definitionally true that:
(B) if I justifiably believe that p then I both believe that p and I am
justified in believing that p
JBp! (Bp&BJp)
Lastly, it is very plausible that justified belief distributes over conjunction:
(C) if I justifiably believe that (p& q) then I justifiably believe that p and
I justifiably believe that q
JBp! (JBp&JBq)
To illustrate this principle, suppose that I justifiably believe that it is both the
case that it is wet in London and that it is rainy in London. Then I justifiably
believe that it is wet in London. And I also justifiably believe that it is rainy in
London. Illustrations cannot prove a principle, but the fact that the principle
is immune to counter-example is good enough reason to think that it is not
only true but indeed constitutive of justified belief.
Since (A), (B) and (C) are necessary truths, it follows that it is impossible to
hold a justified omissive Moore-paradoxical belief:
1. JB(p&Bp) Suppose for RAA
2. JBp&JBBp 1, C
3. JBp 2, &-elim
4. JBBp 2, &-elim
5. BBp & BJBp 4, B
6. BBp 5, &-elim
7. BJp 6, A
8. Bp&BJp 3, B
9. BJp 8, &-elim
10. BJp&BJp 7, 9, &-intro. Contradiction.
11. JB(p&Bp) 1, 10, RAA
In order to prove that it is impossible to hold a justified commissive Moore-
paradoxical belief, we need an analogue of (A):
(A0) if I believe that I believe that not-p then I am not justified in
believing that p
BBp!BJp
Surely I cannot believe that p on the basis of my belief that e, as long as I
think that I believe that not-p. Likewise I cannot produce a justification for
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my belief that p as long as I think that I believe that not-p. Given that (A0) is
also a necessary truth, this yields a proof parallel to that above:
1. JB(p&Bp) Suppose for RAA
2. JBp&JBBp 1, C
3. JBp 2, &-elim
4. JBBp 2, &-elim
5. BBp&BJBp 4, B
6. BBp 5, &-elim
7. BJp 6, A0
8. Bp&BJp 3, B
9. BJp 8, &-elim
10. BJp&BJp 7, 9, &-intro. Contradiction.
11. JB(p&Bp) 1, 10, RAA
I have just shown that it is impossible to hold a Moore-paradoxical belief
that is internally justified. My syllogism for the impossibility of being exter-
nally justified in holding Moore-paradoxical beliefs remains sound. By (B) it
follows that it is impossible to hold a Moore-paradoxical belief that is exter-
nally justified. Therefore, it is impossible to hold a justified Moore-paradox-
ical belief in any sense of justification.6,7
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